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LABOR ARBITRATION: A PRIVATE PROCESS
WITH A PUBLIC FUNCTION
by CLYDE W. SUMMERS*
It is traditional learning, indeed a commonplace legal premise,
that arbitration is a private process created by private agreement.
The arbitrator is a child of the contract, his powers are defined
by the contract, and his award draws validity from the contract.
But one cannot read the Supreme Court decisions of the last five
years without a compelling awareness that this is an incomplete
description of labor arbitration. For though arbitration is a private
process, it performs a public function; though it is a creature of
contract, it is an instrument of national labor policy.
In Warrior & Gulf' the Supreme Court embraced arbitration
of grievances as "a major factor in achieving industrial peace," and
declared that "complete effectuation of the federal policy is achieved
when the agreement contains both an arbitration provision for all
unresolved grievances and an absolute prohibition of strikes. ' '2
Because it serves this national policy "the arbitration of labor
disputes has quite a different function from arbitration under
ordinary commercial agreements."3 The dual character of labor
arbitration as a private process fulfilling a public function lay at
the center of the Court's decision:
For arbitration is a matter of contract and a party cannot
be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has
not agreed to submit. Yet to be consistent with congressional
policy in favor of settlement of disputes through the machinery
of arbitration, the judicial inquiry must be strictly confined
to whether the reluctant party did agree to arbitrate the grie-
anee or agreed to give the arbitrator power to make the award
Professor of Law, Yale Law School, Visiting Professor University of
-Puerto Rico, Summer, 1965.
1 United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & -Gull Navigation Co.,
363 U.S. 574 (1960),
N-363 U. at' 588, 'a. 4.
3 363 U.S. at 578.
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he made. An order to arbitrate the particular grievance should
not be denied unless it may be said with positive assurance
that the arbitration clause is not susceptible to an interpreta-
tion that covers the asserted dispute. Doubts should be resolved
in favor of coverage.4
Any illusions that labor arbitration is simply a creature of
contract was dispelled by the Court's opinion in John Wiley & Sons
v. Livingston.5 Although the collective agreement contained no provi-
sion making it binding on successors, the Court held that the duty
to arbitrate was binding on the successor corporation wiih whom
the employer merged. The generative force was not consent but
"the central role of arbitration in effectuating national labor policy."
It would "derogate from the federal policy ... if a change in corp-
orate structure.., had the automatic consequence of removing a
duty to arbitrate previously established."'6 Then the revealing
sentence:
Although the duty to arbitrate, as we have said, must be
founded on contract, the impressive policy considerations favor-
ing arbitration are not wholly overborne by the fact that
Wiley did not sign the contract being construed.
7
It is futile now to reecho the plaintive cry or. Mr. Justice Whit-
taker that "This is an entirely new and strange doctrine to me,"'8
for lab or arbitration has been firmly impregnated with the public
function. Nor is this without reason. Labor arbitration is an integral
part of the collective bargaining process-a process which, though
it results in a system of private agreements, is neither wholly con-
sensual nor purely private. The union's status is determined by
statute, and the employer has no freedom to choose with whom he
will contract. He is compelled to negotiate, and if agreement is
reached, to sign a written contract which is legally enforceable as
a matter of national policy. In short, the collective bargaining
structure is framed by federal law which limits freedom of contract
4 363 U.S. at 582-3.
5 376 U.S at 543 (1964).
6 376 U.S. at 549.
7 376 U.S. at 550.8 Dissenting opinion in United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior &
Gulf Refining Co., 363 U.S. at 589.
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for the purpose of securing other valued objectives. Labor arbitra-
tion, as a part of that structure, has been co-opted and shaped
by the Court to help achieve those objectives.
The conclusion that labor arbitration is not merely a private
process but that it also performs a public function is only the
beginning of our inquiry. This function is emphasized here only
because the beguiling halftruth that arbitration is based on contract
may cause us to forget that within the collective bargaining structure
grievance arbitration serves a public purpose. Difficult problems
cluster around the central question of how much arbitration is to
be shaped to fulfill public purposes and for what particular purposes,
because arbitration must root in the consent of the parties and must
serve, their private purposes. Thus, the dual character of labor
arbitration creates a potential tension between its public and private
functions. The intention of this paper is to explore this area of tension
in the hopes of gaining a bit better understanding of how this
tension is to be resolved.
The gateway to understanding this problem is a clear recogni-
tion of the essential function of grievance arbitration. When a
dispute arises during the. term of a collective and the parties are
unable to resolve it by negotiation, it can be resolved through one
of three processes -through a contest of economic force, through liti-
gation, or through arbitration. These are the only processes available;
these are the only forums to which the parties can carry their
dispute.9 Arbitration is thus an alternative procedure to trial by
the court on the one hand and trial by combat on the other. It is
because arbitration is the alternative to the other two processes
that it is impressed with a public function.
Arbitration as an alternative to litigation is presented in Steel-
9 On first glance, it might seem that there is a fourth forum -the
employer. The verbal formula would be that if the matter is within the dis-
cretion of management, then the employer is the proper forum. Howevcr, the
grievance inescapably asserts that the decision made by the employer is not
within the scope of his discretion and the employer's answer to the grievance
asserts that it is within his discretion. The very dispute is whether the em-
ployer's action is within his discretion, and it is this dispute which must be
decided by the court, the arbitrator or economic force.
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workers v. Warrior & Gull Navigaton Co.10 The union filed a
grievance claiming that the employer's contracting out maintenance
work violated the collective agreement. When negotiations failed,
the union demanded arbitration, but the employer refused, claiming
that contracting out was "strictly a function of management." In
arguing that the grievance was not arbitrable, the employer was not
suggesting that the dispute should be resolved by economic force,
for that avenue was blocked by the no-strike clause. What the employ-
er plainly sought was a determination by the court that contracting
out did not violate the collective agreement. In arguing that the
dispute was not arbitrable, the employer necessarily asserted that it
should be decided by the court. Implicit was the additional contention
that it should be decided in his favor." The threshold issue before
the court was simply which was the proper forum for deciding
whether contracting out violated the agreement -the court or the
arbitrator.
The choice between judicial and arbitral determination is, in
the first instance, for the parties. When they have clearly agreed,
their choice will be given full deference, but there are concerns beyond
the parties which are to be given weight when their choice is
equivocal. The Court in the Steelworkers case makes two of thes2
articulate. First, the issues raised by grievances and the considera-
tions to be brought to bear are beyond the normal competence of
the courts and are peculiarly suited for the arbitration process. The
courts have an interest in protecting themselves from being burdened
by cases for which they have limited competence when a more
competent tribunal is available. Second, arbitration is viewed by
the Court as making an affirmative contribution to collective bargain.
ing as a sytem of industrial self-government. The arbitrator gives
meaning and content to the collective agreement, molding a system
of private law to meet the needs of the parties and to maintain order in
their relationship. Arbitration thus promotes in a way what the
courts cannot: the, goals which Congress sought to achieve in framing
the structure of collective bargaining. Therefore, when the parties
have not clearly expresed their preference for the judicial forum,
13 Supra note 1.
11 The grievance asserted that the agreement limited the employer's free-
dom to contract out and that the employer had exceeded the limits imposed by
the agreement. The argument that the matter was "not arbitrable" was a
direct denial of the union's grievance by an assertion that the agreement
placed no limits on the employer's freedom to subcontract.
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these considerations weigh in favor of arbitration. In the words
of the Court, "doubts should lie resolved in favor of coverage.'
Arbitration as an alternative to the strike was presented in
Local 174 v. Lucas Flour CoY2 The employer had discharged an
employee for unsatisfactory work. The collective agreement provided
that such disputes "shall be submitted to arbitration" and that "the
decision shail be final and binding," but did not include a no-strike
clause. The union did not seek arbitration but struck to compel
reinstatement, and the employer then sued the union for damages
caused by the strike. The Court held that "a strike to settle a
dispute which a collective bargaining agreement provides shall be
settled exclusively and finally by compulsory arbitration constitutes
a violation of the agreement.'3 When the parties chose arbitration
as the exclusive remedy, they necessarily rejected economic force
as an alternative remedy.
Again the choice between arbitration and economic force is for
the parties. Indeed, the parties might agree that the union should
have its choice of forum; that it could elect to arbitrate or to strike.
But again there are considerations which weigh in favor of arbitra-
tion and against economic force when the parties' choice is cquivocal.
The Court has found a strong congressional policy preferring the
peaceful adjustment of grievances by methods agreed upon by
the parties. Arbitration is favored because it serves this congres-
sional purpose, and resort to economic force is disfavored because
it frustrates this purpose. Thus when the union in Lucas Flour
argued that the provision for arbitration did not preclude trial by
battle, the Court pointed out-that this "would be completely at
odds with the basic policy of national labor legislation to promote
the arbitral process as a substitute for economic warfare." When
the parties have made arbitration available, access to the alternative
process of economic conflict is closed unless the parties have expli-
citly held both avenues open.
From all that has been said it is clear that the parties remain
free to choose the forum for resolving their disputes. They can agree
to carry their unsettled grievances to the court, to the arbitrator,
or to the economic arena, and the law will give binding effect to
their choice. This is not out of indifference but out of deference
12 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
13 369 U.S. at 105.
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to the freedom of the parties to order their relationship through ool.
lective agreement, for values other than freedom of contract make
arbitration tie preferred forum. As a substitute for the courts, arbi-
tration frees judges from the responsibility of adjudicating matters
for which they lack full competence and provides a tribunal peculiarly
suited to meet the needs of industrial self-government. As the
substitute for the strike, arbitration helps achieve industrial peace
and replaces the rule of force with the rule of law. Arbitration is
promoted and relied upon to serve these public purposes. Unless
the parties have made clear their choice to the. contrary, the courts
will prefer that forum which for these public purposes it finds
most appropriate.
To be sure, this impinges on freedom of contract, for it affects
the substance of the bargain. The employer can draft language
which clearly excludes sub-contracting from arbitration but its very
clarity will increase resistance to its acceptance. The employer will
be able to circumscribe arbitration only at the cost of concessions
on other terms or a strike. Similarly, the union can find adequate
words to negative the no-strike obligation, but getting them written
into the contract may prove impossible. In the dynamics of bargain-
ing the burden is always on the one seeking changes, and particularly
changes which require the adding of unambiguous words to the
agreement. However, arbitration remains rooted in the consent of
the parties. Their freedom of contract is burdened only in the small
measure that the public interest in having disputes settled in the
most appropriate forum is given weight in the balance of the bargain
made by the parties.
H
Let us now turn to examine the import of the public function
of arbitration in more troublesome problem areas. A sensitive
problem, and one which has been given new life and meaning by
the evolving law of Section 301, is the right of the individual
employee in arbitration. This involves at least two separable problems
-first, the right of an individual to carry his grievance to arbitra-
tion when the union refuses, and second, the right of an individual
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to participate when the union carries a case to arbitration which
directly affects his interests.1 4
The Supreme Court's decision in Humphrey v. Moore5 provides
the point of departure. In this case, two auto transport cumpanies
were hauling Ford cars from the Louisville assembly plant. When
business declined so that there was not enough for both they agreed
that one, Dealers, would take over the work of the second, E & L.
The employees of both companies were represented by the Teamsters
and were covered by the same multiple employer contract. When
the E & L employees began to be laid off they filed grievances
claiming that the seniority lists should be "sandwiched" and they
should be taken on at Dealers, the surviving company, with their
seniority acquired at E. & L. This grievance was ultimately decided
by the national joint union-employer committee in favor of the E
& L employees. This had the effect of causing the layoff of a large
number of Dealers employees. They sued to enjoin the union and
the employer from giving effect to this decision on two grounds:
1) that it was made in violation of the collective agreement; and 2)
that the local union had violated its duty of fair representation by
taking a position hostile to them and denying them a fair hearing
before the joint committee. The Court held that the individuals
could sue under Section 301 for breach of the collective agreement
and for unfair representation, but found that the decision of the
joint committee did not violate the collective agreement and that
union had not violated its duty of fair representation.
The Court does not attempt to map out the rights of the indi-
vidual under the collective agreement but two basic guidelines are
made reasonably clear. First, the collective agreement is more than
a two party contract between the union and the employer; it creates
legally enforceable rights in individual employees. 16 Second, the
individual can bring suit under Section 301 even though the union
and the employer have agreed upon an interpretation of the agreement
14 There is no intention here to explore the many facets of this problem.
For more complete analysis see Sumnmers, Individual Rights in Collective
Agrceme: ts And Arbitration, 37 N.Y.U.L Rev. 362 (1962); Rosen, The
Individual Worker in Grievance Arbitration: Still Another Look at The Problem,
24 Md. L. Rev. 233 (1964); Blumrosen, The Worker and Three Phases of
Unionism, Administrative And Judicial Control of The Worker-Union Relation-
ship. 61 Mich. L. Rev. 1435 (1963).
15 375 U.S. 335 (1964)
16 This was already firmly established by Smith v. Evening News, 371
U.S. 195 (1962).
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and settled a grievance adversely to his interest. The rights of the
individual in arbitration were not immediately involved r' but these
guidelines and other elements of the opinion have important radia-
tions.
The clearest radiations of the case run toward the second and
simplest of our two problems-the right of the individual to
participate in arbitration proceedings which directly affect his
interests. The Court made articulate the obvious-that the union
does not violate its duty of fair representation by "taking a good
faith position contrary to that of some individuals whom it represents
in supporting the position of one group of employees against that
of another.' '  But the Court also makes plain that the disfavored
employees are entitled to a fair hearing which includes the right to
attend, to present evidence and to state their position. The Court
was, of course, speaking of proceedings before the joint-committee,
the final step in the grievance p'oredure, but the individual rights
are certainly not ]es3 in arbitration. This conclusion would, indeed.
secm self-evident from the essential function of arbitration. For
arbitration serves as a substitute for the judicial process, and when
conflicting claims of seniority arc involved, as in !furnphrey v.
Moore the adjudication is bindin'g not only on those pressing the
grievance but also on those whom they seek to displace. The indi-
viduals have legal rights to the seniority provided by the collective
agreement and it is these rights which the arbitrator is adjudicating
as a substitute for the court. The public function of arbitration
requires that it observe the rudiments of due process. This in no
wise weakens the consensual roots of arbitration, for the union
and management by carrying the case to arbitration have agreed
Up,',n that forum. But they cannot, by choosing that forum deprive
those Whose rights are being determined the opportunity to be heard.
The other problem -the right of the individual to carry his
case to arbitration when the union refuses- is more diffi'~lt and
on this the Court gives less light. We proceed from the premise that
17 The Joint Conference Conmitte whch made the challenget decision
was not an arbitration tribunal but the last step in the grievance procedure.
Athcugh it held hearings and had so-me appearanc:s of an arbitration tribunal,
it was made tp of an equal number of repi.tt entatives of the national employers
a-,ociat'on and the international union. The contract provided that if the
Joint Conference Committee was unable to reach an agreement the matter
was to be submitted to arbitration.
I 375 U.S. at 349.
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the individual's rights under the collective agreement survive a
purported settlement by the union and *the employer which is
contrary to the terms of the agreement. Had Mr. Justice Goldberg's
dissenting view1 prevailed.the individuals' rights would be extingui-
shed by the parties settlement and that would be the end of the
problem. But the majority assumes that the individual can seek a
determination whether the settlement is consistent with the terms
of the agreement. Indeed, the Court explicitly made that determina.
tion. At this point it must be emphasized that the Court did not
make an independent interpretation uf the agreement to find the
one true meaning to ambiguous words. It reviewed the parties
interpretation to see if "the section reasonably meant what the Joint
Committee said or assumed it meant" 0 and found that, "It was
permissible to conclude"21 that the section authorized the zettlement.
The question with which we are concerned is, which is the proper
forum for determining the individual's rights under the collective
agreement, assuming that the parties have provided arbitration for
union grievances of the same class. The public function of arbitra-
tion ponts unmis-akably toward it as the most appropriate forum.
The need for the courts to avoid adjudicating tights governed by
the common law of the shop and to allocate such disputes to more
competcnt tribunals is the same as in other grievances. In addition,
the considerable value in developing a coherent body of indutrial
law to govern the parties also commends that equivalent issues not
he decided in different forum. And finally, the individual's right
to equal treatment requires 'that his rights be determined by the
same tribunal as those of his fellow workers.
The private nature of arbitration points in both directions. If
the employer has agreed to arbitrate with the union, to compel
him to arbitrate with the individual is to go beyond the bounds of
his expressed consent. But one might ask whether this narrow view
of who are parties to the arbitration agreement is not even more
dryly conceptual than the employer's contention in Wiley v. Liv-
ingston.2 The heart of the employer's objection is that to allow the
individual to demand arbitration adds to the burden of the obliga-
19. Mr. Justice Goldberg concurred in result, but he vigorously dissented
from the majoritv's anal'sis of the rights of the individual under the collective
agreement. See 375 U.S. at 352-5.
20 375 U.S. at 345.
21 375 U.S. at 346.
22 Supra note 5.
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tion, for in agreeing to arbitration the employer counted on the
union's reasonableness and willingness to settle. But this added
burden may be more verbal than real, for the union's settlement
cannot bar the individual from seeking an adjudication of his rights
either in the courts or before an arbitrator. The added burden, if
it is any, is that of arbitration instead of litigation. On the other
hand, arbitration of the individual's claim fulfills the more funda.
mental purposes of the parties' agreement to arbitrate. The parties
have agreed that arbitration is the more appropriate forum for adjudi.
cating the class of issues at hand; they have bargained for the
special considerations and judgment which an arbitrator will bring
to bear; and if arbitration is more expensive because they must
pay the arbitrator, they have judged that his competenc is worth
the cost. To decide the individual grievance in court would defeat
their deeper expectations.
These considerations weigh heavily in favor of arbitration as
the proper forum for adjudicating individual rights when the
agreement has provided arbitration for the kind of issue involved,
at least when the contract does not explicitly provide otherwise.
Whether an explicit provision barring the individual from the forum
generally available for determining disputes would run athwart
other statutory policies or prohibitions, we cannot explore here.23
When the individual carries his case to arbitration, the union
is clearly a necessary party. It has a separable interest in the outcome
of the case, and the decision will become a part of the body of law
which influences future cases. Moreover, the tribunal cannot fulfill
its function unless it knows the considerations which led the union
to conclude that the claim lacked merit. The practical consequence
of having the union as a party will be to give added weight to inter-
pretations agreed upon by union and management to the extent
that they are reasonable within the context of the words of the
agreement and the established practices of the parties. The result
will be equivalent to that suggested by the Court in Humphrey v.
Moore-whether the contract "reasonably meant" what the parties
assumed it meant.
23 See note 14 supra.
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III
Far more difficult problems of arbitration as a private process
performing a public function are projected by the two headed case
of Carey v. Westinghouse.24 The NLRB had certified the IUE as
bargaining agent for "all salaried technical employees," except
production and maintenance employees. Each union had made i
collective agreement containing a recognition clause stating that
the company recognized the union as exclusive representative for
the units certified by the NLRB and listing the units. Thus, the IUE
agreement listed "all production and maintenance employees" in
the plant "but excluding all salaried and technical employees." The
IUE filed a grievance claiming that certain salaried employees in
the engineering laboratory were in fact doing production and
maintenance work and that this violated the union recognition
clause. The company refused to arbitrate on the grounds that this
was a dispute over representation and was for the NLRB. The
Supreme Court did not attempt to determine whether this was a
dispute as to whether the work should be assigned to employees in
the IUE bargaining unit rather than to employees in the Federation
unit, or whether it was a dispute as to which union should represent
the employees doing the work. Instead, the Court examined the
problem from both hypotheses.
Treating it as a work assignment dispute, the Court pointed
out that although Section 10 (k) provides a procedure for resolv-
ing such disputes, this section can be invoked only if there is a
strike or threat of strike. Unwilling to find a hiatus allowing no
recourse to arbitration of work assignments without forcing the
dispute to the strike stage, the Court held that grievance arbitration
was available. The Court acknowledged that only one of the unions
had sought arbitration so an adjudication might not put an end
to the dispute, but it added hopefully, "the arbitration may as a
practical matter end the controversy or put into motion forces that
will resolve it."12
Treating the dispute as one involving representation rights, the
Court recognized that Board procedures were available, for either
the union or the employer could move to have the certification
2 375 U.S. 261.
25 375 U.S. at 265.
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clarified and thereby resolve the dispute. This, however, did not
preclude arbitration, for remedies before the Board did not preempt
rcmedies for breach of the collective agreement. The Court again
acknowledged that the arbitrator's decision would be inconclusiv.
not only because the other union was not a party to the proceedings,
but because final authority on representation mattexs was for the
NLRB and different decision by it would take precedence. But
the Court redoubled its hope that "resort to arbitration may have
a pervasive, curative effect even though one union is not a party." 26
Before analyzing this curious mixture of judicial frustration
and faith, we would suggest that the Court's result may have been
better than its reasoning. There is reason to suspect that this was
in fact neither a work assignment dispute between two unions nor
a genuine representational dispute. The opinions bear no trace of
any claim by the Federation that this work belonged to the salaried
and technical employees. And if the employer genuinely believed
that this was a represcnation issue, why did it not reinforce its
claim of non-arbitrability by petitioning the Board and settling the
issue rather than fighting a three year battle in the courts? The
Court may have sensed that in reality nothing more was involhved
than a claim that the employer had improperly transferred work out
of the bargaining unit, a garden variety case for arbitration.2 7
The dispute was with the employei, not the other union and arbitra-
tion would in fact settle the matter.
If there is a full-fledged work assignment dispute between tw.3
unions, ordering arbitration between the employer and one union
serves little public or private purpose. To be sure, national policy
favors the arbitration process for deciding such disputes-this is
implicit in Section 10 (k). And it is presumed that such problems
are within the special competence of arbitrators. But the arbitration
process which Section 10 (k) endorses is one in which both unions
are parties; and there can be no confidence in the competence of
an arbitrator who does not hear the opposing claims. There is also
a strong national policy that these disputes between unions be
resolved by adjudication, either before arbitrators or the Board.
rather than by economic warfare. However, arbitration with one
union will scarcely pacify the other, but will rather lead the other
26 375 U.S. at 272.
27 Indeed, the case so viewed is strikingly parallel to United Steelworkers
of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., supra note 1.
HeinOnline  -- 34 Rev. Jur. U.P.R. 488 1965
LABOR ARBITRATION: A PRIVATE PROCESS '1r211 A PUBLIC FUNCTION 489
union to distrust such orderly processes. Such "therapy of arbitra.
tion" may be the masaging of broken bones. The courts have an
additional interest of their own-the interest in not debasing their
own processes by ordering procedures which may stultify rather than
resolve and which raise serious problems of due process. All of
these considerations would seem to undermine any presumption
of arbitrability and point toward refusing to compel arbitration
unless the employer and union had explicitly agreed that such
disputes were to be referred to the arbitration.
An immediately appealing alternative is for the courts to order
tripartite arbitration, making the other union a party to the proce.
eding.28 Such an arbitration will permit full consideration of the
competing claims, provide a final award, and avoid recourse to
economic force. It will fulfill all of the public purposes of arbitra-
tion and the national policies for settling these disputes-that is,
all but one: the policy that arbitration be rooted in the consent
of the parties. The question then is posed, how much does this
violate the consent of the parties? If both collective agreements
contain arbitration clauses which encompass work assignment dis-
putes, then all parties are agreed that arbitration is the most appro-
priate forum for such issues. Nor is the problem significantly altered
because two contracts are being interpreted simultaneously, for the
is sue under each contract is the boundary line between the two. The
lack of consent lies in the fact that each union agreed to arbitrate
with the employer but not with each other, and the employer agreed
to arbitrate with each union but. not with both together. In part
this means that an unexpeced party will be present at the hearing,
pre-enting evidence, cross-examining witnesses and giving evidence.
But the parties have small claim that arbitration awards should be
made without fullest exploration of the issues, and the arbitrator
has a responsability beyond the immediate parties to make a fully
considered decision. Indeed, he might call upon the other union to
add any relevant evidence or viewpoint. More substantial is that an
uninvited party shares in the selection of the arbitrator, and this
2 For a vigorous advocacy of this procedure, see Jones, Autobiography
of A Decision: The Function of Innovation in Arbitration and The National
Steel Orders of Joinder and Interpleader, 10 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 937 (1963).
For an exploration of sorne of the improprieties and pitfalls of this procedure,
see Bernstein, Nudging And Shoving All Parties to A Jurisdictional Dispute
Into Arbitration: The Dubious Procedure of National Steel, 78 Harv. L.
Rev. 784 (1965).
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may result in the choice of a different person than if either union
were arbitrating with the employer alone. Because the parties view
the identity of the arbitrator as an important part of the process
and the choice of the two unions might be quite different, this can-
not be dismissed as a minor encroachment on their freedom of
contract. It is this which strips court ordered tri-partite arbitration
of its appeal. But if the alternative is to compel a two-party proceed-
ing which can give the parties no effective award but only lead to
another equally fruitless proceeding, then the tri-partite solution looks
less unlovely and less at odds with the needs and expectations of
the parties. Faced with this choice, I believe the court should fashion
a tri-partite procedure unless one for the agreements explicitly
precludes it.
Needless to say, if either or both agreements have no arbitra-
tion provision encompassing work assignment issues, then tri-partite
arbitration cannot be ordexed. For here there is lacking a tap root
of consent to the arbitration process. And Section 10 (k) makes
clear that unions shall be free to reject arbitration of their work
assignment disputes.
Perhaps we should think more of the third alternative-the
one the Court dismissed as unthinkable. Refuse to order arbitration
and open the forum of economic contest by declaring that the no-
strike clause does not reach such disputes. If we look closely at this
solution its seeming coursencss may have a rugged beauty. When
the IUE threatened to strike to compel assignment of the work,
either the Company, the Federation, or even any employee could
file a charge under Section 8 (b) (4). This would bring into play
Section 10 (k). If the parties could not then agree to arbitration,
the dispute would be decided by the Board applying, according to
the command of the Supreme Court, "the standard generally used
by arbitrators."29 That standard will be the two collective agreements
and the boundary line between, drawn by the parties in response
to the Board's certification. The employer will thereby obtain a
final and binding decision in an appropriate forum. There is a risk
that in spite of the threat of strike or even a strike itself neither the
company nor the other union or any other person will file a charge to
set the statutory solution in action, but this risk may be prefer-
29 NLRB v. Radio & Television Broadcast Engineers, 364 U.S. 573, 583
(1961).
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able to the admittedly unsatisfactory alternatives. And one might find
some therapeutic value in the strike, particularly where the, parties
have a variety of peaceful solutions readily at hand once they feel
the pinch of economic loss.
The other problen posed by Carey v. Westizhghousc is quite
easy to unravel, if one is not bemused by the Courts unlounded
reliance on arbitration. If the dispute is which union should repre-
sent the employees involved, arbitration is neither necessary nor
appropriate. The proper forum is the NLRB and it is available by
a simple motion to clarify the certification. The emp!oyer and both
unions will be parties to the proceeding and the decision will be
final and binding. More important, the issue is not within the
competence of the arbitration for it is not a matter of contract
right but of statutory right. Indeed the parties cannot by contract
expand the union's right to represent employees beyond the. bargaining
unit defined by the Board, particularly at the expense of another
union certified for an adjoining unit. In Westinghouse neither union
by its agreement could draw the boundary line other than where
the Board would draw it. And an arbitrator presented with the issue
could find no useful guides in the contract, but would he compelled
to look to Board principles and premises. As the Court admitted,
if the Board draws a different line the arbitrator's decision is
revealed as meaningless. To commit this issue to arbitration is to
rip arbitration from its roots of consent as expressed in the collective
agreement. The Court's justification that the Board will give defer-
ence to the arbitral award only underlines that the rights being
adjudicated are statutory, and in turn raises questions as to the
propriety of the Board's giving such deference to private arbitra-
tion. But this is a discrete problem to be reached later.
The Courts rhetorical device of looking at the case first as a
work assignment dispute and then as a representation dispute mutes
a major consideration. One of the most difficult problems, as Carey
itself makes clear, is deciding which kind of a dispute is involved.
This, in turn, poses the thereshhold quesion of who is to catagorize
the dispute. The Court avoided this question by finding that the
same forum was appropriate for both kinds of disputes, and though
it did not emphasize the weight to be given this consideration, it is
undoubtedly substantial. The Court wisely directed both disputes
to the same forum, but unwisely preferred the wrong forum. Only
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tlc Board can settle the representation issue, and with a fully
adequate procedure including all of the parties. Directing the work
as:ignment dispute toward a Section 10 (k) proceedings is at least
no worse than the alternatives, and the Board which has competence
in both kinds of disputes can make, any catagorization necessary.
For these reasons, when a genuine boundary dispute between two
unions is involved, the best solution would be to refuse, to compel
arbitration unless all three parties had explicitly agreed to so submit
such disputes.
IV
Though arbitration has a public function and serves certain
pulblic purposes, it is still a private process of limited potential.
Though arbitration is "an instrument of national labor policy for
composing contractual difference," it is not the sole or even prin-
cipal instrument for promoting industrial peace. There is a danger
that it will be burdened by public responsibilities beyond its com-
petence or capacity to bear. As the Court's opinion in Carey reveals,
that danger rests in those blindly infatuated with the arbitration
process who love not wisely but too well.
The seriousness of the danger is made plain by Carey v. West-
inghouse, for the Court ordered arbitration of the representation
is_.ue and then suggested that the Board give deference to the arbi-
trator's decision. But the specific issue is the interpretation and
clarification of the Board's decision as to the boundaries of the
bargaining units. Thus arbitration is conscripted as a substitute
for the Board and asked to perform the public function for which
the Board has been specially established. And the Board, charged
by Congress with this responsibility, will give deference to a private
arbitrators interpretation of its own order.
The Board's doctrine of deference to arbitration may take less
gross forms disguised with the words of sweet regsonaleness. For
exanple, in the International Harvester case," the union demanded
the discharge of an employee for failing to pay dues under the union
shop agreement, and when the employer refused earried the case to
arbitration. In the meantime the contract had expired and had been
So International Harvester Co. 138 NLRB 923 (1962).
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replaced by one without a union security clause. The arbitrator ruled
that since the employee should have been dismissed under the old
contract but could not be discharged under the new contract, he
should be treated as discharged and then retircd under the new
contract. This, of course, reduced his seniority and later led to his
lay-off. He thcm filed a charge with the Board, claiming unlawful
discrimination because at the time his seniority was reduced no
valid union security clause was in effect. The Board extolled the
N irtucs of arbitrators and the Courts deference to it in contract
disputes. From this it concluded that "complete effectuation of
federal policy" required that the Board "give hospitable acceptance
to the arbitral process. . . unless it clearly appears that the arbitra.
tion proceedings were tainted by fraud, collusion, unfairness, or
serious procedural iregularities or that the award was clearly repug-
..art to the Act.' 3 1 Because the award was not "palpably wrong"
the Board found it unnecessary to inquire into the merits. To do
mere "would mean substituting the Board's judgment for the arbitra-
tion ' 32 contrary to national labor policy.
But is it contrary to national labor policy for the Board to
substitute its judgment as to what constitutes an unfair labor practice
for that of an arbitrator? The charge filed by the. individual is not
that his loss of seniority violates the contract but that it violates the
statute. For the Board to honor the award unless it is "palpably
wrong" is to place on the arbitrator the responsibility not only to
interpret the contract but to interpret the statute. The arbitrator may
be a perceptive lawyer to whom the Board might wisely listen;33
but he may also be an economist, a human relations expert, or a
Catholic priest with no knowledge of the legal issues. And the arbi.
tration process will be confused if not wholly distorted if the parties
and the arbitrator realize that the award will substitute for the
Board's judgment. The difficult position of the arbitrator and the
inappropriateness of contract arbitration is especially acute in a
case like International Harvester, for the very purpose of the union
shop proviso in Section 8 (a) (3) is to prohibit the making of
certain agreements. The arbitrator, appointed under the contract
31 138 N.L.R.B. at 927.
32 138 N.L.R.B. at 929.
33 The arbitrator in the case was David L. Cole who is an experienced
labor lawyer as well as one of the nation's outstanding arbitrators, and member
of many governmental commissions and panels.
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to interpret the contract, is deferred to in this determination as to
whether the contract violates the Act. The arbitrator may well at-
tempt to construe the contract to avoid a clash with what he believes
the law requires, but his position ill-suits him to give voice to
statutory pdlices which run against the contract.
In other cases where discharges are claimed to violate both
contractual and statutory rights, the Board has said that it would
postpone action until after the contractual rights have been adjudi-
cated.3 The Board may thereby avoid the necessity of making a
decision, for if the arbitrator orders reinstatement and back pay,
the Board procedures become superfluous not because statutory right
have been vindicated but because the substance of the violation has
disappeared. But for the Board to shelve the case until after arbitra-
tion adds to the already debilitating slowness of the Board procedure.
To make exhaustion of contract remedies a prerequisite to statutory
procedures means that the existence of possible contract rights
qualifies statutory rights-a rather novel conclusion which also
assumes that one who had meaningful contract rights, enforceable
in arbitration, would prefer the ponderous Board procedures.
There are cases in which the Board should defer to arbitration,
for an unfair labor practice may depend on the meaning of the
contract. If an employer unilaterally eliminates a Christmas bonus,
without consulting the union, this constitutes a refusal to bargain
unless the contract reserved this right to the employer. Whether the
contract authorizes the employer to take unilateral action should be
left to the arbitrator. 5 But the guiding principle remains the same
-the responsibility for interpreting the contract belongs to the
arbitrator, but the responsibility for interpreting the statute rests on
the Board. The national labor policy favors arbitration as a substi-
tute for the courts in giving meaning and content to collective
agreements; but Congress has created the Board as a specially com-
petent tribunal and designed a specially adapted procedure for giv.
ing meaning and content to the statute. For the Board to covet
the court's servant and appropriate that servant to perform its work
is a violation of the statutory commandment.
34 See Dubo Manufacturing Co., 53 L.R.R.M. 1070 (1963).
35 See Speidel Corp.. 120 N.L.R.B 733 (1958).
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CONCLUSION
These are but illustrative problem areas which reveal the ten-
sion between the private nature and the public function of labor
arbitration. They make quite clear that a failure to recognize the
dual character of arbitration and to accommodate the dual needs
can discredit or abuse the process. To view arbitration solely as the
product of a private agreement between the union and the employer
misleads some to conclude that an individual employee had no
right to participate in the procedure. But to deny an individual
whose very fate is at stake the right to be heard can only discredit
arbitration as an instrument of justice. To overemphasize the public
function of arbitration misleads both the Board and the Court to
confer upon arbitrators whose authority and guides are defined
by the collective agreement the power to interpret and apply statutes.
This imposes on a private process, created for limited purposes, a
public responsibility beyond its capacity to bear.
There is no simple solution, for the public and private func-
tions of arbitration inevitably qualify each other. But we can make
the necessary accommodation if we keep clearly in mind the roots
of each function. The private nature of arbitration is rooted in
private agreement-agreement to use arbitration, agreement as to
the guides to govern the arbitration, agreement as to the choice
of the arbitrator. The public function of arbitration is rooted in
its use as a substitute for public tribunals on the one hand and
economic battle on the other. If we expect neither too little nor
too much of arbitration, we can find solutions which will enable
it to fulfill adequately both functions.
SUMARIO
En este trabajo el autor considera la tensi6n entre la natura-
loza privada y la funci6n publica dcl arbitraje laboral.
Como ejemplos para su exposici6n, el autor toma casos re-
cientemente decididos por (l Tribunal Supremo de los Estados
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Unidos de Amirica. Concluye que es peligroso considerar el arbi.
traie coma el resultado exclusivo de un acuerdo privado entre una
uni6n y el patrono, al igual que es peligroso enfatizar demasiado
la funci6n pfiblioa. Debe el arbitraje satisfacer adecuadamente am-
bas funciones.
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